What a theory of knowledge-how should explain : a framework for practical knowledge beyond intellectualism and anti-intellectualism by Bartels, Andreas & May, Mark
What a Theory of Knowledge-How 
Should Explain
A Framework for Practical Knowledge beyond Intellectualism and Anti-
Intellectualism
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We argue against both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist approaches to know-
ledge-how. Whereas intellectualist approaches are right in denying that know-
ledge-how can be convincingly demarcated from knowledge-that by its supposed
non-propositional nature (as is assumed by the anti-intellectualists), they fail to
provide positive accounts of the obvious phenomenological and empirical peculiar-
ities that make knowledge-how distinct from knowledge-that. In contrast to the in-
tellectualist position, we provide a minimal notion of conceptuality as an alternat-
ive demarcation criterion. We suggest that conceptuality gives a sound basis for a
theory of knowledge-how which is empirically fruitful and suitable for further em-
pirical research. We give support to this suggestion by showing that, by means of
an adequate notion of conceptuality, five central peculiarities of knowledge-how
as compared to knowledge-that can be accounted for. These peculiarities are its
context-bound,  impenetrable and implicit  nature, as well as the automatic and
continuous forms of processing that are connected to it.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we shall argue against both intel-
lectualist and anti-intellectualist approaches to
knowledge-how,1 for  their  failing  to  provide  a
suitable framework for empirical research on the
subject of practical knowledge. Anti-intellectual-
ists propose, following Ryle (1949), that intelli-
gent  action  embodies  “practical  knowledge”,
which is distinguished from “theoretical know-
ledge”  by  its  manifesting  abilities  or  disposi-
tions.  Intellectualists,  in  contrast,  claim  that
there is only one sort of knowledge that is char-
acterized by having propositional content (e.g.,
Stanley 2011b). Practical knowledge, according
to  intellectualists,  is  rather  distinguished  by
how propositional contents are applied in action.
Whereas intellectualist approaches (e.g., Stanley
2011b), we shall argue, are right in denying that
practical  knowledge  can  be  convincingly  de-
marcated from theoretical knowledge by its sup-
posed  non-propositional  nature,  nevertheless
they fail to provide a conceptual framework in
which the peculiarities by which practical know-
ledge stands out could be made visible. 
On  the  other  hand,  anti-intellectualists
(e.g.,  Newen &  Jung 2011) often present phe-
nomenologically-motivated  identifications  of
forms of practical knowledge with certain rep-
resentational  formats.  Classificatory  schemas
without theoretical foundation—that is, without
a  general  conceptual  framework  within  which
these  classifications  naturally  emerge,  and
without  any  clear-cut  specification  of  the  ex-
planatory tasks that have to be fulfilled by that
classification—have  only  limited  value  as  a
manual  for  empirical  research.  Such  schemas
cannot even be judged according to explanatory
productivity or completeness. 
The first part of the paper (sections 2,  3,
and 4) will be concerned with the shortcomings
of  both  intellectualist  and  anti-intellectualist
approaches, partly programmed by Ryle’s fam-
ous, but also somewhat misleading, exposition
of the subject. The perception of these deficien-
cies of both intellectualist and anti-intellectual-
1 Ryle, in his seminal approach, uses the term “knowing how” instead of “knowledge-
how”. We don’t follow his usage because we think, contrary to Ryle, that know
how-phrases ascribe genuine knowledge, i.e., knowledge of truths (see section 2).
ist approaches leads us to the conclusion that a
philosophical  framework  for  practical  know-
ledge, in order to provide a basis for further em-
pirical research, has in the first instance to lay
some firm meta-theoretical ground. 
The second part of the paper (sections  5,
6,  and  7)  will  provide  necessary  elements  for
such a ground by identifying some central beha-
vioral peculiarities of practical knowledge that
must be explained by any empirically-adequate
theory of knowledge-how. As will be seen, this
is,  above  all,  its  context-bound,  impenetrable,
and  implicit nature,  as well  as  the  automatic
and  continuous forms of  processing  that  are
connected to it. These five peculiarities will, in
turn, be illustrated by examples stemming from
the  realms  of  sensorimotor  knowledge
(Milner/Goodale),  intuitive  knowledge  (Dama-
sio), and expert versus novice knowledge (An-
derson), among others. We proceed by propos-
ing  a  possible  realization  for  the  explanatory
tasks  identified  in  the  meta-theoretical  part:
here we will argue that it is not by recourse to
(non-)propositionality  in  any  of  its  different
senses that the peculiarities of practical know-
ledge can be explained; instead, we shall argue,
conceptuality is a more suitable criterion for de-
marcating practical from theoretical knowledge,
and for explaining their respective peculiarities.
By  “explaining”  the  peculiarities  of  practical
versus theoretical knowledge we do not mean a
kind of logical “derivation”. “Explaining” here is
rather  to  be  understood  as  showing  how the
realization of necessary conditions for the pos-
session of concepts coincides with those condi-
tions  that  have  to  be  fulfilled  in  order  to
achieve  the  step  from practical  to  theoretical
knowledge, each characterized by their respect-
ive peculiarities. In other words, we search for
“how-possible-explanations” of  the  peculiarities
of  practical  versus  theoretical  knowledge.  The
driving role of conceptuality would also explain,
in  that  sense,  why  the  contents  of  practical
knowledge cannot be easily verbally expressed,
let  alone abstractly represented.  Such abilities
only enter the scene, we argue, when knowledge
reaches the conceptual level.
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2 The shortcomings of intellectualist 
approaches
Ryle (1949), in his seminal work on knowledge-
how,  established  a  tradition  of  thinking  that
knowledge-how, as opposed to knowledge-that,
is  essentially  characterized by its  non-proposi-
tionality. That an action is intelligent, and thus
embodies practical knowledge, comes not in vir-
tue of its being “controlled by one’s apprehen-
sion of truths”, according to Ryle, but instead
in virtue of its manifesting an ability or a dis-
position. Thus, Ryle’s notion of propositionality
of knowledge is from the start coupled with a
specific  model  of  knowledge-application.  Since
this model cannot be true, practical knowledge
cannot be employed by applying propositions.
Indeed, if a person, in order to apply knowledge
had first to “consider a proposition”, stored in
his or her memory, this very act of considering a
proposition would itself be an instance of prac-
tical knowledge and thus would be in need of a
further act of considering a further proposition,
and so on ad infinitum. Note that this means,
at  most,  that  practical  knowledge  cannot  be
manifested by virtue of  this  sort of application
of  propositions.  But,  as  Fodor has  remarked,
“[if] the intellectualist says that, in tying one’s
shoes,  one rehearses shoe-tying instructions to
oneself,  then the intellectualist  is  wrong on a
point of fact” (1968, p. 631). Thus, in order to
avoid the whole debate turning out as a non-
starter, we first have to disentangle the claim of
propositionality of practical knowledge from the
Rylean model of knowledge-application. But in
what other  sense,  then,  could practical  know-
ledge be propositional? 
The  answer  is  that  practical  knowledge
could be propositional in the sense that a per-
son has practical knowledge by virtue of there
being a rule that has a symbolic, language-like
(“propositional”)  representation,  which  is  not
accessible to consciousness, and which is not in
need of being consciously “considered” in order
to be applied in action. The knowledge embod-
ied by this rule is instead applied in action by
means of some kind of sub-personal processing
of the representation.  Fodor (1968) has defen-
ded  such  an  intellectualist  answer  to  Ryle’s
challenge by suggesting that the non-conscious
representation  governing  the  application  of
practical  knowledge  embodies  “tacit  know-
ledge”; since such tacit knowledge is applied by
means of automatic mechanisms (not by inten-
tional acts), it cannot fall victim to Ryle’s re-
gress argument.
If we ignore the vagueness of this reading
with respect to the  units of processing in which
this symbolic  representation should appear, the
foregoing may be a good answer to the question
of how practical knowledge could possibly be pro-
positional  knowledge.  In  the  eyes  of  Stanley
(2011b),  a  more  general  conclusion  could  be
drawn.  According  to  him,  since  this  argument
that knowledge-representations need some auto-
matic mechanisms (and not something like “con-
sidering” a proposition) in order to be applied in
action, is true irrespectively of the kind of know-
ledge involved,  symbolically represented or  not,
all kinds of knowledge are completely  on a par
with  respect  to  their  representations—whatever
they are—having to play some functional roles,
mediated by an automatic mechanism, in order to
be applied in action. Thus, Ryle’s analysis,  ac-
cording to which practical knowledge has a  dis-
positional  nature, can be accepted, but only at
the price of accepting it for all sorts of knowledge.
As such, not only can practical knowledge be pro-
positional, but the whole distinction between pro-
positional and non-propositional knowledge turns
out  to  be  irrelevant  for  characterizing  sorts  of
knowledge,  and  a  fortiori cannot  be  used  to
ground the distinction between practical and the-
oretical knowledge.
In  other  words,  it  is  important  to  hold
apart the thesis that knowledge is propositional
in the sense of its being based on language-like
representations,  accessible  to  consciousness  or
not,  from  the  empirically  implausible  Rylean
model of knowledge application, which presup-
poses an act of “considering” a proposition. If
we keep this distinction in mind, we find that
propositionality  per se  does not provide a cri-
terion for the theoretical versus practical know-
ledge  distinction.  Instead,  all  kinds  of  know-
ledge have to be “dispositional” in some sense,
irrespective  of  their  being  based  on symbolic,
language-like representations or not.
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Some  anti-intellectualists,  following  Ryle,
use  the  notion  of  “propositionality”  of  know-
ledge to refer to the fact that a person has con-
scious access to linguistic propositional repres-
entations (that is, that a person has sentences
“in her mind”). Thus, for example, Michael De-
vitt,  in  a  recent  paper  (Devitt 2011),  argues
that intuitively “to attribute any propositional
attitudes to the ant [who has the skill of finding
its way back to its nest by virtue of some neural
processing] simply on the strength of that com-
petence seems like soft-minded anthropomorph-
ism” (Devitt 2011, p. 208). But the impression
of  anthropomorphism  only  occurs  if  we  con-
strain the notion of a propositional attitude to
refer  to  a  conscious  act  by  which  a  person
relates to a linguistic propositional representa-
tion. The impression disappears as soon as we
replace this interpretation of “propositional atti-
tude” with a version in which the “proposition”
is a rule, represented by symbolic encoding to
which the ant is related by virtue of her neural
mechanisms processing this encoding (or by vir-
tue of her neural mechanisms being structured
in such a way that they realize some implicit
rule). That the ant “grasps a proposition” ap-
pears to be a strange description only under the
presupposition  that  guidance  by  propositions
implies the conscious possession of linguistic en-
tities.
Moving  from these  “intuitive”  considera-
tions to arguments from the “science of know-
ledge-how”  (cf.  Devitt 2011,  p.  207),  Devitt
identifies a “folk distinction between knowledge-
that  and knowledge-how” with  the  “psycholo-
gical one between ‘declarative’ and ‘procedural’
knowledge” (2011, pp. 208-209). Now, declarat-
ive knowledge, according to Devitt, is character-
ized (according to what he sees as a consensus
in  psychology)  by  conscious  representation of
what is known (cf. Devitt 2011, p. 210). For ex-
ample,  a  person  has  declarative  knowledge  of
arithmetic rules only if she consciously repres-
ents those rules. Concerning procedural know-
ledge, Devitt refers to the distinction from com-
puter  science  between  “processing  rules  that
govern  by  being  represented  and  applied  and
those  that  govern  by being  simply embodied,
without being represented” (2011, p. 210). Since
there is, according to Devitt, no decisive empir-
ical  evidence  to  tell  us  whether  skills  involve
representations of the governing rules or not, he
takes the recent picture that psychology paints
of procedural knowledge “as constituted some-
how or other by embodied, probably unrepres-
ented rules  that  are inaccessible  to conscious-
ness” (Devitt 2011, p. 213). Finally, he argues
that empirical evidence from cognitive ethology
confirms  this  distinction  between  declarative
and  procedural  knowledge  by  indicating  that
the “surprisingly rich cognitive lives” of desert
ants,  western  scrub  jays,  or  bottle-nosed  dol-
phins can be understood as based on forms of
procedural knowledge (to be identified with the
folk notion of “knowledge-how”), but not on de-
clarative knowledge (“knowledge-that”).
Thus,  surprisingly,  the  anti-intellectualist
Devitt and the intellectualist Fodor would agree
to subsuming sub-personal knowledge, whether
represented in explicit or implicit form, under
the  heading  of  knowledge-how.  But  the  first
would classify it as non-propositional, the latter
as  propositional  knowledge.  The  real  dissent
seems to be about the question whether repres-
entations being conscious (and being accessible
in linguistic form) or non-conscious makes a rel-
evant  difference  for  sorts  of  knowledge.  We
think  that  conscious  availability/unavailability
expresses a relevant difference for sorts of know-
ledge,  but  a  difference  that  can  only  be  ex-
plained by recourse  to some fundamental  dis-
tinction between practical and theoretical know-
ledge.  Phenomena  indeed  indicate  that  the
boundary  between  practical  and  theoretical
knowledge coincides pretty well with conscious
availability/non-availability.  But  Devitt’s  dis-
tinction  just  repeats this  phenomenon,  rather
than  explaining  it.2 What  we  look  for  is  a
deeper reaching distinction that would be able
to explain phenomenal differences such as con-
scious  availability/non-availability  and,  as  a
consequence,  verbalizability/non-verbalizability.
2 In the same way,  Adams (2009) argues for a knowledge-that/know-
ledge-how distinction on the grounds of empirical evidence that takes
recourse to experimental findings showing that declarative and pro-
cedural  memory  can  operate  independently  from  each  other.  We
think that such empirical phenomena constitute explananda of the
searched-for distinction, but cannot provide decisive evidence for the
existence of  a fundamental  difference between knowledge-how and
knowledge-that.
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Thus,  the  propositionality  criterion  appears
again unsuited for drawing an empirically-inter-
esting distinction between practical and theoret-
ical knowledge. As far as the intended distinc-
tion concerns the transfer of knowledge into ac-
tion (this aspect is exactly that to which Ryle’s
distinction refers), ways of representing know-
ledge seem to be “on a par” and thus insensitive
with respect to the distinction. 
According  to  Stanley,  it  is  the  semantic
notion of propositionality, with respect to which
all sorts of knowledge can be subsumed as “pro-
positional” (knowledge-that), be they based on
conscious  or  non-conscious  representations,  by
explicitly represented or simply embodied rules.
Thus, Stanley has argued that the way in which
a piece of knowledge is implemented (or repres-
ented)  has  nothing  to  do  with  a  distinction
between two kinds of knowledge. Therefore, the
distinction between “declarative” and “proced-
ural” knowledge as it is widely used in psycho-
logy should not be misunderstood, according to
him, as providing some ground for the know-
ledge-that  versus  knowledge-how  distinction:
“the latter is a putative distinction between two
kinds of state, rather than a distinction between
two ways of implementing a state” (cf.  Stanley
2011b, p. 151). Paradigmatic examples of prac-
tical knowledge, in the sense of knowledge being
manifested  by  intelligent  conduct,  could  turn
out  to  be  represented  in  a  language-like  way
(without any conscious mediating act of “con-
sidering a proposition”), whereas clear examples
of theoretical knowledge could fail to have any
language-like representational background. 
Stanley’s  semantic reading of proposition-
ality is concerned with the reference of “know
how”-phrases  by which we ascribe  knowledge-
how to persons. According to our best available
linguistic theories, as Stanley argues, know how-
phrases have to be understood to refer to pro-
positions.  But  this  fact,  in  the  first  instance,
does not include anything about the role those
propositions play in the intelligent action of a
person who knows the propositions. In particu-
lar, it does not follow that such a person pos-
sesses  language-like  symbolic  representations
that  guide  the  person’s  intelligent  action,  or
that such a person “considers” the proposition
in order to apply his knowledge in action. If the
correct understanding of the semantics of know-
ledge-phrases, no matter whether it is theoret-
ical or practical knowledge that is ascribed by
them, is  that they refer  to propositions,  then
this propositional nature of knowledge, accord-
ing to this reading, cannot be used to draw any
distinction  between  theoretical  and  practical
knowledge. 
Now,  someone  could  object  that  Ryle’s
distinction  is  concerned  with  the  nature  of
knowledge,  e.g.,  how knowledge is  represented
in a person, but not with what is involved in
knowledge ascriptions. Thus the semantic read-
ing of  propositionality would be irrelevant for
the theoretical versus practical knowledge dis-
tinction. But note that Ryle’s analysis of prac-
tical knowledge actually starts by asking ques-
tions like: “When the person is described by one
or other of the intelligence-epithets” (Ryle 1949,
p. 28), what sort of knowledge is this descrip-
tion imputing to the person? That is, Ryle asks
for  the  semantics  of  knowledge-ascriptions  for
typical cases of practical knowledge. Therefore,
it is not at all clear that a semantic reading of
propositionality is irrelevant for his analysis. On
the contrary,  the  sense  in  which Ryle  is  con-
cerned with the  “nature”  of  knowledge  is  ex-
pressed, by him, by means of an analysis of the
role that knowledge-phrases play in actual lin-
guistic practice.3
It  has  now been  shown that  both  pos-
sible  readings  of  “propositionality”,  that  is,
the  representational  and  semantic  readings,
are  relevant for  Ryle’s  proposed  theoretical
versus  practical  knowledge  distinction,  but
neither is suited to grounding the distinction:
Whether  a  piece  of  knowledge  is  a  case  of
practical or of theoretical knowledge does not
depend  on  whether  it  is  supported  by  lan-
guage-like  structures  or  not;  and,  since  all
knowledge  is  semantically  propositional  (if
Stanley is right) it does not depend on its se-
mantic propositionality either.
3 Contrary to this, Noë (2005) argues that “Ryle’s distinction is not a
thesis about the sentences used to attribute propositional and prac-
tical knowledge, respectively”. He claims that “Ryle was not an or-
dinary language philosopher”.  How then, would Noë,  for example,
understand Ryle’s appeal to linguistic use in his deflationary account
of the “will”? 
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Thus,  it  seems as if  no criterion for the
distinction  between  practical  and  theoretical
knowledge could be available from the intellec-
tualist  point  of  view.  But,  we shall  see  that,
from Stanley’s revised dispositional analysis of
knowledge,  rather  surprisingly  a  new possible
criterion emerges. Let us, therefore, follow the
path of this analysis, which is intended by the
author to show how, contrary to Ryle, the (se-
mantic)  propositional  nature  of  knowledge  is
compatible with its dispositional nature.
According to  Stanley (2011b), even if we
accept Ryle’s general claim that knowledge has
to be understood as dispositional,4 “there still
need to be automatic mechanisms that mediate
between  dispositions  (and  abilities)  and  the
manifestation or execution of these dispositions
and abilities” (Stanley 2011b, p. 26). What has
to be true of theoretical knowledge, namely the
existence of  mechanisms that mediate the ap-
plication of that knowledge, has to be also true
of practical knowledge. The complex of disposi-
tions on which the ability to catch the fly ball
rests  may  be  completely  intact,  even  if  the
player sometimes does not succeed in catching
the ball because he has become tired or has mo-
mentarily  lost  concentration.  When  that  hap-
pens, his executing mechanisms can fail. As has
often  been  identified  in  the  debate  on  know-
ledge-how,  having  the  right  dispositions  (and
thus  having  the  right  sort  of  practical  know-
ledge) does not always guarantee successful per-
formance (cf. Snowdon 2004). 
Even if,  from the  intellectualist  point  of
view,  all  forms  of  knowledge—be they  “prac-
tical” forms of knowledge or not—could be, and
indeed  have  to  be,  analyzed  with  respect  to
their  dispositional  nature,  the question seems,
by the very phenomenology of practical know-
4 Contrary to what Noë (2005) has claimed, Stanley thus does not attack
Ryle’s identification of “knowledge how” with the possession of abilities
tout court. What Stanley objects to is the supposed opposition between
knowledge as the possession of abilities and propositional knowledge on
which Noë, assuming that propositional knowledge necessarily entails un-
derstanding of propositions, insists. Even the earlier work (Stanley &
Williamson 2001) tries to account for the dispositional nature of prac-
tical knowledge by introducing the concept of a “practical mode of think-
ing”. On the contrary, any unrestricted identification of knowledge-how
with abilities confronts the problem of how to account for cases in which
practical knowledge survives the loss of ability. The distinction between
dispositions and their manifestation by means of executing mechanisms
accounts for this problem. 
ledge, to be more urgent than for cases of theor-
etical knowledge: How can knowledge be dispos-
itional  and  propositional  at  the  same  time?
Stanley &  Williamson (2001)  have  suggested
that cases of  practical knowledge can be cap-
tured by means of a “practical mode of think-
ing”,  by  which  a  person  who  has  practical
knowledge has access to propositional contents.
If, for example, a person knows  that a certain
way of riding a bike is a way for her to ride a
bike, then her thinking of that proposition is in
a peculiar way self-directed, it is a “first-person-
way”  of  thinking  the  proposition.  Stanley
(2011b)  has  developed  this  suggestion  further
into a dispositional theory of knowing a propos-
ition.
Gareth Evans (1982),  in  his  analysis  of
“demonstrative knowledge”, has provided a use-
ful  framework of  first-person  dispositions:  My
thinking is a demonstrative belief about a per-
ceptually-presented object if I will be disposed
to have changes in that object affect my belief
(Stanley 2011b, p. 110). Thus, my thinking of
an object in the world as “myself” involves a
permanent disposition to let my thoughts and
actions be determined by my own bodily per-
ceptions. Now this schema seems to fit the prac-
tical way of thinking that occurs when it comes
to propositions like “This way of riding a bike is
a way to ride a bike for me”: A person mani-
fests knowledge of this proposition by, while rid-
ing a bike, manifesting the disposition to react
to  certain  kinesthetic  sensations  mediated  by
her  own  bodily  movements  by  means  of  ad-
equate motor commands.
We accept this as an adequate way of de-
scribing  the  phenomenological  peculiarity  of
“practical ways of thinking” a proposition. In-
deed,  when  described  in  this  way,  practical
knowledge  can  be  propositional  and  disposi-
tional at the same time. But this analysis does
not tell us—and indeed is not meant to tell us
—how  the  distinction  between  practical  and
theoretical  knowledge  can  be  grounded.  That
there is such a distinction seems obvious  inter
alia on the basis of the functional characterist-
ics peculiar to practical knowledge, such as its
domain-specific nature, its limited transferabil-
ity,  its non-penetrability,  and so on. Stanley’s
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dispositional theory fails, at least at first sight,
to deliver any resources for explaining why prac-
tical  knowledge  is  distinct  from  theoretical
knowledge on the basis of these functional char-
acteristics. The main shortcoming of recent in-
tellectualist approaches,  in our opinion, is  not
that  they  simply  neglect  the  peculiarities  of
practical knowledge. Rather  they are deficient
insofar as they do not provide an explicit posit-
ive  demarcation  criterion  of  practical  versus
theoretical  knowledge  that  would  go  beyond
capturing the well-known phenomenological pe-
culiarities and make it compatible with the pro-
posed fact that all knowledge is (semantically)
propositional.  Before  we go  back to  Stanley’s
analysis, in order to show how some explicit de-
marcation  criterion  could  possibly  be  drawn
from it, we ask whether recent anti-intellectual-
ist approaches do a better job of providing a de-
marcation criterion.
3 The shortcomings of anti-intellectualist
approaches
The  anti-intellectualist  position  has  recently
been  supported  by,  among  others,  Toribio
(2008),  Young (2011)  and  Newen &  Jung
(2011). Newen and Jung assume that Ryle’s dis-
tinction  between  knowledge-how  and  know-
ledge-that should be taken as referring to the
nature of knowledge. From a naturalist point of
view,  the  most  general  way  to  characterize
knowledge is to say that it is based on mental
representations.  Thus  the  distinction  between
practical and theoretical knowledge, from that
perspective, has to be spelled out as a distinc-
tion between ways of representing something, or
between representational formats. Now, theoret-
ical  knowledge,  according  to  Newen &  Jung
(2011), can be identified with the propositional
representational format, whereas they hold that
practical knowledge comes in two (non-proposi-
tional)  varieties,  one  characterized  by  the
format of sensorimotor representations, and the
other by what they call  image-like representa-
tions.
Concerning  the  first  of  these  representa-
tional formats, namely the propositional format,
we are  confronted with the  same problem we
faced when considering Ryle’s notion of proposi-
tionality. What does it mean to say that a rep-
resentation is propositional? It should not mean
that the content of the knowledge is or can be
made available to the person in the form of con-
sciously-accessible  linguistic structures.  Even if
the property of  explicitness vs. implicitness of
knowledge is often used to distinguish between
theoretical and practical knowledge, this merely
descriptive criterion does not help to explain the
theoretical  versus  practical  distinction,  but
preferably  should  be  explained  by  the  more
principled criterion we are looking for. If, on the
other  hand,  we  take  “propositional”  to  mean
that the kind of processing connected to a piece
of knowledge has a language-like structure, how
do we identify the units of processing to which
this characterization is supposed to refer? Even
if it were possible to precisely identify the level
of processing that accounts for propositionality,
it would be far from clear how the characterist-
ics  of  theoretical  versus  practical  knowledge
could be explained by means of that supposed
representational fact. As we have already poin-
ted out in discussing Ryle’s notion of proposi-
tionality: Why should it be the case that “the-
oretical” knowledge is necessarily connected to
propositional  representations,  and,  correspond-
ingly, practical knowledge to non-propositional
ones?
According to  Young (2011), what we call
“knowledge-how” may appear in different forms,
which are accompanied by more or less compre-
hensive linguistic mastery of propositions. The
sort of knowledge a guitar player manifests in
his playing may be either such that he is able to
articulate that, for example, G should be played
rather than G#, or such that he may only be
able to experience his performance as appropri-
ate guitar playing (Young 2011, pp. 57f.). In the
latter case, his knowing how to play guitar is
constituted by specific dispositions to react in
particular ways to the conscious auditory and
motor experience of his own playing. Even this
form of knowledge may be reducible to proposi-
tional  knowledge,  however,  since the player  is
potentially  able  to  instruct  himself  with  the
help of demonstrative pronouns denoting parts
of  his  actual  auditory  experiences.  Whereas
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those forms of knowledge-how may, according to
Young, be reducible to propositional knowledge,
he thinks that there is a clear case of irreducible
knowledge-how that is constituted by “purely”
sensorimotor  abilities,  and  that  is  exercised
without being supported by any kind of propos-
itional  knowledge.  Such kinds  of  sensorimotor
abilities are exemplified, according to Young, by
the case of  DF in the Milner/Goodale-experi-
ments.
Patient DF is impaired in her ability to re-
cognize  objects,  despite  showing  intact  basic
visual processing abilities. Milner and coworkers
presented to DF a letterbox in  which the slot
through which one inserts letters could be rotated
to  vertical,  diagonal,  or  horizontal  orientations.
DF had problems when she was asked to visually
match the orientation of the slot to different al-
ternatives. However, when asked to actually insert
a letter, she was able to reach towards the slot
while orienting her hand in accordance with the
spatial orientation of the slot. Thus, DF has the
ability to use visual information in purposeful ob-
ject  manipulations  without  being  able  to  con-
sciously visually process or experience them. On
the other hand, another patient, IG, showed con-
scious visual awareness of objects without being
able to practically manipulate them. Apparently,
then, there are two independent neural pathways
for  processing  visual  information:  the  ventral
path, leading to visual identification and corres-
ponding to conscious experience, and the dorsal
path, used for non-conscious action control and
execution. In pathological cases, one or the other
(DF vs. IG) of these pathways does not work,
whereas  the  other  remains  intact  (Milner &
Goodale 1995, 2008). 
What is the reason for Young’s assuming
that the case of DF exhibits “irreducible” know-
ledge-how? The reason seems to be that DF is
not  able  to  use  linguistic  propositions—in
whatever rudimentary form—to refer to aspects
of the visual scene. She simply has no conscious
access  to  the  visual  scene  whatsoever.  Young
thus takes “propositionality” of knowledge to be
constituted  by  conscious  access  to—possibly
rudimentary  forms  of—linguistic  propositions.
But, as we already have seen, lacking conscious
access  to  linguistic  propositions  accompanying
the performance of knowledge-how does not ex-
clude the “propositionality” of that knowledge-
how in the semantic sense of “propositionality”,
and neither does it exclude the “propositional-
ity”  of  that  knowledge  in  the  sense  of  being
based upon symbolic language-like processing.
Toribio (2008)  gives  a  similar  argument
against  the  possible  propositionality  of  DF’s
knowledge. She argues that 
DF  has  no  conscious  awareness  of  this
visual information [the information avail-
able on the dorsal route] and has no phe-
nomenal experience as to the appropriate-
ness of her own performance, but she has
proprioceptive  awareness  of  the  features
that govern her visually guided action in
this particular task. (cf.  Toribio 2008, p.
13) 
This  situation,  according  to  Toribio,  is  relev-
antly  different  from the  example  of  Hannah’s
knowing how to ride a bike. In the latter case,
Hannah has not only proprioceptive,  but  also
conscious  awareness of the sensory information
available.  Why does this difference matter? It
matters,  Toribio suggests,  because in order to
make plausible that a person’s knowledge-how is
somehow “guided” by a proposition, this guid-
ance has to be spelled out by a real process of
“entertaining” or “contemplating” the proposi-
tion by the person. Suggesting a propositional
reading of Hannah and DF’s knowledge without
being able to point out some possible realization
of  “entertaining  a  proposition”  in  these  cases
“threatens  to  make us  lose  our  grip  on what
propositional knowledge is” (cf. Toribio 2008, p.
13). But  Stanley & Williamson (2001), Toribio
claims,  are  unable  to  provide  such a  possible
realization in the case of DF: 
DF couldn’t possibly entertain such a pro-
position because she cannot grasp one of
its constituents – she cannot perceive the
features, e.g. the orientation, that governs
her  motor  behavior  in  the  posting  task,
and hence couldn’t  recognize them as in
any way constituting a reason for her ac-
tion. (cf. Toribio 2008, p. 9) 
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We think that Stanley’s elaboration on “prac-
tical ways of thinking a proposition” is able to
overcome this objection. We can very well un-
derstand what it means that a person thinks a
proposition  p without  being  able  to  sensually
identify the objects constituting p. Sensual iden-
tification (“grasping”) is a precondition for con-
ceptual  apprehension  of  the  constituents  of  a
proposition, but it is not a precondition for non-
conceptual  attitudes to propositional  contents,
by way of proprioceptive information.
What the performance of DF in the Mil-
ner/Goodale-experiments indeed shows is  that
sensorimotor processing of visual information is
sufficient for entertaining practical abilities and
does  not  require  any  conscious  processing,  in
particular no linguistic processing, if we suppose
that  linguistic  processing  is  necessarily  con-
scious.5 This result does not imply that sensor-
imotor  processing  is  independent  of  (and  op-
posed to) propositional  processing.  Sensorimo-
tor processing could use “propositional” repres-
entations, only if these propositional representa-
tions  were  not  linguistic  representations  (cf.
Fodor 1968). Thus, the case of DF cannot be
understood as supporting the sensorimotor-pro-
positional processing-classification of knowledge.
There is still no indication that there are two
independent  types  of  cognitive  processing,  a
propositional  and  a  sensorimotor  one,  to  say
nothing about the possible explanatory virtues
of such a distinction.
That  the  sensorimotor  vs.  propositional
classification is lacking any theoretical founda-
tion that could determine whether this distinc-
5 Note that this does not necessarily mean that there is also no con-
ceptual processing involved. As Stanley points out, declarative know-
ledge is  sometimes defined as “knowledge that can be consciously
and intentionally recollected”, as opposed to procedural knowledge,
which is taken to be “knowledge expressed through experience-in-
duced changes in performance” (Stanley 2011b, p. 154). This reading
of the procedural-declarative distinction proposes to fix it by trans-
lating  it  into  the  “explicit”  versus  “implicit”-distinction,  where  it
seems to exactly match the distinction of two pathways of processing
that are exhibited in the Milner/Goodale-experiments. But it cannot
be taken as grounding the theoretical versus practical knowledge dis-
tinction. We agree with Stanley, who claims that practical knowledge
can have a propositional content that is able to be verbalized—the
subject can be able to linguistically express what she knows.  Stan-
ley’s example is that of “physicians skilled at a procedure, who are
also very good at describing to others how they do it”—they “pos-
sess explicit procedural knowledge” (2011, p. 159). Thus knowledge
may be procedural in the sense of the above definition, and at the
same time conscious and linguistically expressible.
tion is already complete or has to be completed
in certain ways becomes obvious when further
classificatory distinctions are proposed. For ex-
ample, Newen & Jung (2011) introduce, in addi-
tion  to  the  sensorimotor  and  propositional
format, a third representational format, called
image-based  knowledge, which  they  think  can
supplement the knowledge-how variety. An ex-
ample of image-based knowledge, according to
the authors, is a high jumper’s generation of a
mental  image  of  his  planned jump before  his
running up. The authors argue that the mental
image can take the role of controlling the per-
formance of the action. The action, in cases of
image-like  knowledge,  is  thus  “guided”  by  an
image, just as motor reactions to bodily experi-
ence  supposedly  guide  actions  in  the  case  of
sensorimotor knowledge, and propositions sup-
posedly  guide  actions  in  the  case  of  proposi-
tional knowledge. Now, we think that it is far
from clear how mental imagery or real images
can  “guide”  actions.  Even if  we  could  clarify
what “guiding” here means, there is at least a
possible alternative interpretation of the role of
mental  images  in  acting,  namely  a  common
cause  interpretation,  according  to  which  the
performance of the action and the occurring of
a corresponding mental image have a common
cause, namely the neural processing that is the
real cause of  the different aspects of  the per-
formance,  which  thus  “guides”  the  action.  If
such an interpretation was correct, the mental
image  would  not  be  a  “guide”,  but  would
merely be an epiphenomenon of the processing
that  produces  the action (cf.  Pylyshyn 1984).
That this alternative interpretation exists shows
that there is  no clear indication that “image-
based knowledge” is an independent third kind
of  knowledge  that  would  legitimately  supple-
ment the classification.
On the other hand, research in psychology
and cognitive neuroscience indicates that it  is
possible  for  non-conscious  and  non-linguistic
types of knowledge (e.g., intuitive knowledge) to
guide  actual  behavior,  and  which  cannot  be
classified as “sensorimotor” knowledge.6 As long
6 A further type of practical knowledge that fulfills this criterion seems
to be expert knowledge in areas that are not reducible to sensorimo-
tor processing: e.g., chess or financial stock markets.
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as there is no theoretical principle or framework
from which the classification of possible forms
of knowledge-how can be derived, there is in our
opinion  no  reason  to  exclude  such  types  of
knowledge from the knowledge-how variety.
To  give  an  example  of  non-sensorimotor
knowledge-how:  Bechara et al. (1997) examine
the  behavioral,  subjective,  and  physiological
states  involved  in  intuitive  decisions.  Parti-
cipants played a card game (known as the Iowa
gambling task) in which they had to repeatedly
(up to 100 times) pick cards from four different
decks that could lead to wins as well as losses.
In the long run, drawing from some decks led to
smaller or larger winnings, and others to smaller
or larger losses. The goal was to maximize one’s
play  money  on  the  basis  of  a  $2000  starting
sum.  Unknown  to  the  participants,  the  card
decks were pre-organized so that all decks would
lead to wins in the first few draws. During the
game two good decks turned out to be relatively
safe (i.e., small wins and losses) leading to an
overall net win, while two bad decks turned out
to be relatively risky (i.e., large wins, but also
large losses) leading to overall net loss.
The  hidden  win-loss  dynamics  and  rela-
tions  between  the  outcomes  allowed  the  re-
searchers to separate different periods of card-
drawing behavior (standing for different know-
ledge states) during the game. A first  pre-pun-
ishment  period stood  for  the  phase  of  early
wins, a second pre-hunch period for the phase in
which  subjects  started  to  get  a  feeling  that
there were differences between decks in terms of
safety vs. risk-taking, a third hunch period for a
phase in which subjects started liking or dislik-
ing certain decks without exactly knowing why
this was the case, and a last  conceptual period
in which subjects were able to articulate their
preferences and the reasons for these preferences
between  different  decks.  Not  all  participants
reached the  hunch  or the  conceptual period of
the game. 
Of  foremost  interest  were  observations
made  in  the  pre-hunch  period.  Normal  parti-
cipants,  as  opposed  to  participants  with  pre-
frontal  damage,  began  to  develop  behavioral
preferences  for  the good and less  riskier  card
decks during this phase, and also showed anti-
cipatory skin conductance responses (reflecting
minimal perspiratory reactions standing for fear
responses) when planning to draw from riskier
decks, although they were not consciously aware
of these preferences, or of any physiological re-
actions during this phase of the game. Showing
these  non-conscious  and involuntary  responses
during the pre-hunch period was prerequisite for
subjects to advance to the hunch as well as the
later conceptual period. A control group of pre-
frontally-damaged  participants7 did  not  show
any of the described physiological skin responses
during the experiment, and their card-drawing
behavior  as  well  as  their  subjective  reports
showed no sign that they had developed know-
ledge  of  the  riskier  behavior  associated  with
picking cards from certain decks.
The intuitive knowledge that is reflected in
this study makes up for a further possible form
of knowledge-how (for other examples of intuit-
ive knowledge see Myers 2004; for intuitive core
knowledge about geometry, numerosity, and or-
dering see  Spelke 2000; for intuitive knowledge
of experts see Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1986). Instead
of adding new forms of knowledge-how in some
arbitrary way, we think that it is more prom-
ising to look for a general criterion for know-
ledge-how that has the potential to explain the
salient characteristics of knowledge-how, and at
the same time is suited to give a framework for
the possible surface forms in which knowledge-
how  may  appear,  including  the  sensorimotor
and intuitive  forms described above.  We sup-
pose that the most promising candidate for such
a criterion is non-conceptuality.
4 How can propositional knowledge be 
non-conceptual?
How can it be true that the knowledge held by
a person is “propositional” in its semantic sense8
without being conceptual? Would not the per-
7 Several studies (e.g., Barch et al. 2001; Bechara et al. 2000; Halligan
et al. 2004; Stuss & Alexander 2007) indicate that lesions of the pre-
frontal cortex can lead to a number of cognitive and affective prob-
lems, most notably working memory problems, deficits in executive
functioning such as planning, goal selection, task monitoring, deficits
in inhibiting thought and action impulses, problems in outcome anti-
cipation, and risk-taking behavior.
8 Note that we have accepted Stanley’s thesis that all knowledge is
propositional in that sense.
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son necessarily need a grasp of the concepts a
proposition is “composed of” in order to have
knowledge of  that proposition? The answer is
that in order to have conscious knowledge of a
proposition given in  linguistic form it is neces-
sary to have a grasp of the concepts of which
the linguistically-given proposition is composed.
But Stanley’s notion of knowing a proposition is
not  restricted  to  linguistically-given  proposi-
tions. For example, if  Hannah knows the pro-
position that “this way is a suitable way for me
to ride a bicycle”, her way of knowing this pro-
position is a practical way of knowing that does
not include knowledge of linguistic entities, but
shows up by manifesting dispositions to react to
certain  kinds  of  bodily  experiences.  Thus,  as
much as knowledge-how is involved, it is  pos-
sible  to  have  knowledge  of  a  proposition
without being  able  to grasp the concepts the
proposition is “composed of” when given in a
linguistic form. The case can be made plausible
by looking again at the Milner/Goodale-experi-
ments: although the patient DF knows “how to
put a card into a vertical slot”—and thus knows
a proposition—due to  a defect  in  her  ventral
pathway she is  not able to have a conceptual
understanding of  the  linguistic  components of
that proposition.
Stanley (2011b) has formulated objections
to  conceptions  of  non-conceptual  content,  at
least  when  they  are  directed  against  proposi-
tionality  tout court, as for example in  Dreyfus
(2007), according to whom “embodied skills […]
have a kind of content which is non-conceptual,
non-propositional,  non-rational  […]”  (p.  360).
His main argument is that ascriptions of know-
ing-how create opaque contexts (Stanley 2011b,
p. 168). But this argument does not seem very
strong, if seen from Stanley’s own perspective of
a  dispositional  reading  of  ways  of  knowing  a
proposition  in  the  case  of  knowing-how.  How
the objects occurring in the propositional con-
tent are conceptualized does not make any dif-
ference  to  the  subject’s  knowing  the  proposi-
tion, namely his being disposed to react to his
own bodily experiences in a certain way (think
of  the  guitar  player).  Thus,  the  dispositional
reading of propositional knowledge is simply not
compatible with the proposed fact that proposi-
tional contents are individuated by concepts. In-
stead, it implies that, in case of knowledge-how,
persons have propositional knowledge that is in-
determinate with respect to any conceptualiza-
tion  of  the  objects  occurring  in  the  proposi-
tional content. We therefore object to Stanley’s
claim that “I cannot be said to know how to
ride a bicycle if I have no clue what a bicycle
is”  (Stanley 2011b,  p.  170).  Someone  can  be
able to manifest  a well-determined disposition
with respect to riding a bicycle, whatever con-
ceptual understanding, if any, he has about bi-
cycles.
In  face  of  the  DF-case  in  the
Milner/Goodale-experiments,  Stanley  admits
that:
[…]  DF cannot  accurately  report  on  the
orientation of the slot, whereas the normal
agent can. DF’s knowledge of how to put a
card into a slot is propositional knowledge
that is based on a non-conceptual under-
standing of the orientation of the slot, un-
derstood here  in  the  sense  of  an  under-
standing of the orientation of the slot that
is not available to conscious apprehension.
She is able to have propositional attitudes
about a way of posting a card into a slot
in  virtue  of  this  non-conceptual  under-
standing of orientation, yielded by her in-
tact  dorsal  processing  pathway.  In  con-
trast,  the  normal  agent  does  have  con-
sciously available knowledge of the orienta-
tion of the slot before she acts. This is a
difference  between  DF  and  the  normal
agent,  but  not  one  that  can  be  used  to
deny that DF’s action is guided by propos-
itional  knowledge  of  how to  put  a  card
into a slot. (Stanley 2011b, p. 172)
In  the  remaining  sections,  we  will  follow  the
path opened by the suggestion that knowledge
can be propositional without being conceptual.
Whereas we hope to have shown that the pro-
positional/non-propositional-distinction  is  not
fruitful  for  explaining practical  knowledge,  we
argue  that  the  conceptual/non-conceptual  dis-
tinction does have this potential. The idea, fol-
lowing  Stanley’s  proposal,  is  that  knowledge-
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how is, in general, knowledge of propositions by
way of  non-conceptual  understanding.  But we
do not stick to the definition of “conscious ap-
prehension”  that  in  the  DF-case  indeed  coin-
cides with conceptual grasp. There can be con-
ceptual grasp even in the absence of conscious
apprehension (as it seems to be the case for cer-
tain animal species where the presence of con-
sciousness is at least doubtful). Instead we take
recourse to a minimal conception of “conceptu-
ality”  that  has  been  developed  by  Newen &
Bartels (2007)  in  the  context  of  animal  con-
cepts. This minimal conception does not depend
on consciousness.  First,  however,  we shall  ex-
plore the already-noted peculiarities of practical
knowledge. It is these peculiarities that a fruit-
ful conception of knowledge-how, based on the
contrast between “conceptuality” and “non-con-
ceptuality” needs to be able to explain.
5 The peculiarities of practical 
knowledge
An adequate meta-theory of human knowledge
should be able to account for empirical differ-
ences  observed  when  people  use  practical
rather than theoretical knowledge in the most
general  terms,  and be  able  to  deliver  an ex-
planation  for  these  differences.  The  starting
point for the need to distinguish between prac-
tical and theoretical knowledge is the behavi-
oral  and  neurological  differences  or  dissoci-
ations in performance in different sensory, mo-
tor, or cognitive tasks, e.g., performance differ-
ences  between  experts  and  novices,  between
normal  and  prefrontal  patients,  between  DF
and IG. In actual research observed behavioral
or neurological differences and dissociations are
often  accounted  for  by  describing  them  in
terms of polar opposite knowledge attributes or
effects. In our understanding this is a first step
in the direction of a theory of knowledge-how,
even if it is still short of delivering a satisfact-
ory explanation of the observed behavioral and
neurological differences.
In the cognitive science and psychological
literature, one finds the following polar opposite
ascriptions  of  attributes  of  knowledge-how  as
opposed to knowledge-that:
A.  Context-bound  versus  context-free
knowledge. Knowledge-how is specific to the do-
main or the situation of its use, whereas know-
ledge-that  is  not.  In  other  words,  knowledge-
how is about situational skills, while knowledge-
that  is  about  general  facts  (e.g.,  Clark 1997;
Clancey 1997). For example, throwing a javelin
and anticipating its  movement  when it  leaves
the hand is a case of context-bound knowledge,
whereas  calculating  the  biomechanical  forces
needed for optimal performances (e.g., the bal-
listics of an optimal flight trajectory) is an in-
stance of context-free knowledge. Chess experts
as compared to novices have superior context-
bound knowledge of constellations of chess fig-
ures,  which  helps  them  to  reproduce  specific
shortly-presented  board  situations  from
memory.  However,  their  superior  knowledge
does not help expert chess players to reproduce
random  constellations  of  chess  figures  from
memory,  as  their  skill  for  applying  context-
bound  perceptual  chunking  mechanisms  on
meaningful  constellations  of  figures  does  not
prove beneficial.
B. Impenetrability versus penetrability of
knowledge. Knowledge-that  is  penetrable  by
other  cognitive  processes  or  meta-processing,
whereas knowledge-how is impenetrable (Pyly-
shyn 1984,  1990). Impenetrability means that
use  of  knowledge-how is  not  changed  by in-
ternally  (e.g.,  beliefs,  goals)  or  externally
(e.g.,  distracting  stimuli)  triggered  cognitive
processes. One example is subitizing, i.e., the
rapid,  accurate,  and  confident  estimation  of
the  number  of  displayed  elements  (e.g.,
stones), which works fine and is robust against
internal  or  external  distractions.  In contrast,
the  use  of  knowledge-that  to  determine  the
number  of  regularly  arranged  objects  by
counting  them  or  doing  mental  arithmetic
(e.g.,  adding  over  rows  of  elements
3+5+4+2+…)  is  prone  to  interferences  from
internally-  or  externally-activated  cognitive
processes. If athletes change the order of dif-
ferent  sensorimotor  sub-processes  (e.g.,  in
technical sport disciplines such as high-jump-
ing or hitting a golf ball), they can encounter
considerable  problems  and  might  need  addi-
tional  time  and  effort  to  build  up  new
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knowledge-how. Not so well-trained movements
(e.g., dancing steps in beginners) can be more
easily rearranged.
C. Implicit versus explicit knowledge. Use
of knowledge-how takes place largely outside of
awareness  and  hence  cannot  be  verbalized,
while knowledge-that is to a large degree con-
sciously available and can be verbalized. In the
last  decades  psychological  research  has  made
substantial  progress  in  distinguishing  between
implicit and explicit forms of human learning,
memory, and information processing (e.g., Dijk-
sterhuis &  Nordgren 2006).  People  learn  the
grammar of natural language or internalize their
society’s norms implicitly, that is, without con-
scious  knowledge  of  the  principles  that  guide
their language use or their social behavior (e.g.,
Reber 1989). Implicit memory is, for example,
displayed in cases of amnesia, in which patients
are  not  able  to  explicitly  recall  previously-
presented items or events from memory, while
performances on tasks that do not require expli-
cit memory such as perceptual priming or sen-
sorimotor  skills  are  undisturbed  and  virtually
normal (e.g., Tulving & Schacter 1990).
D.  Automatic  versus  effortful  processing.
Use of knowledge-how is automatic in the sense
that it requires little attentional monitoring or
guidance,  and  in  the  sense  that  that  its  de-
mands on working memory are quite low (Bargh
&  Chartrand 1999).  Use  of  knowledge-that  is
generally more effortful, and can be shown to
require significant attentional as well as working
memory resources (Hasher & Zacks 1979). Good
examples of  the distinction between the auto-
matic  and  effortful  use  of  knowledge  can  be
found in the domain of spatial cognition: Blind-
folded navigators (animals as well as humans)
complete triangles by returning to the starting
point on the basis of automatic vestibular and
kinesthetic path-integration mechanisms (know-
ledge-how), while only humans are able to use
effortful  geometrical  calculations  (knowledge-
that) to find their way back to the origin of the
outbound travel. Experiments show that simul-
taneous  secondary  tasks  (e.g.,  to-be-ignored
spatial movements vs. counting operations) dif-
ferentially affect the one or the other type of
knowledge  processing  (May &  Klatzky 2000).
To give another example from research on spa-
tial cognition: Wayfinding on the basis of mul-
timodal  sensory  inputs  from the  surroundings
and from automatic updating is very different
from the quite effortful and highly disturbable
use of knowledge-that that results from listening
to verbal route-descriptions or maps (Montello
2005). 
E.  Continuous  versus  discontinuous  pro-
cessing. Use of knowledge-how expresses itself in
smooth and continuous processing, while know-
ledge-that is normally reflected in step-by-step
processing along a discontinuous path of inter-
mediate knowledge states. Recent dynamic sys-
tems accounts of the sensory, motor, and cognit-
ive processes underlying human knowledge use
describe these differences in terms of different
attractor landscapes of mental or neural state
spaces  (Spivey 2008).  Research  into  children’s
cognitive development, for example, reveals that
there are two levels of spatial location coding in
memory. In a first phase, children learn to code
the metric distance between locations (e.g., al-
lowing them to find previously hidden objects in
terms of distance from the sides or the corners
of a rectangular sandbox). In a second phase,
children attain the ability to impose organiza-
tion on their spatial  knowledge (e.g.,  allowing
them to divide the spatial layout in hierarchical
subsections or regions). The shift from the first
to the second level reveals itself in changes in
the  types  of  spatial  errors  (discontinuous  vs.
continuous distributions) children commit when
locating hidden objects (Newcombe &  Hutten-
locher 2000). 
This  list  of  opposing  attribute  pairs  is
probably  not  complete,  but  seems  a  good
starting  point  for  our  purposes.  It  can  be
thought of as a general description and char-
acterization of practical knowledge in contrast
to theoretical knowledge. Not every single case
of knowledge use will be easily describable by
means of the list,  or will  even require a full
description along all opposing attribute pairs.
However,  chances  are  good  that  the  over-
whelming majority of cases will be adequately
described by using such a set of opposing at-
tributes,  and,  generally,  the  profile  over  the
five attributes will correctly apply. We will ar-
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gue that this list of attribute pairs,  together
with their predominant assignment to the one
or  other  knowledge  variety,  is  what  an  ad-
equate  and  fruitful  theory  of  knowledge-how
vs. knowledge-that should be able to account
for.
6 Conceptuality as a demarcation 
criterion for knowledge-that versus 
knowledge-how
We propose conceptuality as a demarcation cri-
terion for knowledge-that in relation to know-
ledge-how that is able to account for the peculi-
arities of both knowledge types outlined in the
last section. In order to show that conceptuality
can do the job, we have, in a first step, to es-
tablish a notion of  concept  that does not  pre-
suppose in  an  obvious  way  characteristics  of
knowledge-that,  i.e.,  the  notion  we  look  for
should not entail that concepts are essentially
linguistic  entities  enabling  persons  to  verbally
express knowledge-that. What we then need, in
a second step, is a notion that entails some fun-
damental  and  (hopefully)  non-contentious  as-
sumptions  about  necessary  conditions  for
concept possession in terms of abilities. Charac-
terizing concepts in the form of abilities neces-
sary for concept possession should enable us to
show that  having those abilities  necessary for
concept possession is exactly what is needed for
the subject to overcome the peculiar limitations
accompanying knowledge-how, and thus to gain
access to the level of knowledge-that (see sec-
tion 5).
In shaping the sought-for notion of con-
ceptuality we take recourse to work by  Allen
& Hauser (1991), Pylyshyn (1990), and Newen
&  Bartels (2007).  Allen  and  Hauser  have
claimed  that,  from  the  perspective  of  inter-
preting the behavior of systems including hu-
man and animal organisms as much as artifi-
cial  systems,  the  ascription  of  genuine  con-
cepts requires “evidence supporting the pres-
ence of a mental representation that is inde-
pendent of solely perceptual information” (Al-
len &  Hauser 1991, p. 231). The criterion of
independence, as called for by these authors,
is that it enables the system to show flexible
behavior, in contrast to the performance of ri-
gid mechanisms:9 
[I]ndependence  in  this  sense  entails  that
the responses of  the animal to a certain
stimulus are not just ‘driven by’ that stim-
ulus, and are also not to be explained as
cases  of  stimulus generalization,  i.e.,  dis-
crimination by a mechanism responsive to
a single basic stimulus. (Newen & Bartels
2007, p. 287) 
If the reactions of a system to a given stimulus
can be modified by the presence of additional
stimuli representing the peculiarities of the situ-
ation in which the reaction occurs, the system
will be first able to generalize—as rudimentary
as  that  ability  may  be—the  information  re-
ceived.  It  is  then  that  we  can  legitimately
ascribe the possession of concepts: “First, an or-
ganism  whose  internal  representations  are
concept-like should be able to generalize inform-
ation obtained from a variety of perceptual in-
puts and use that information in a range of be-
havioral situations” (Newen & Bartels 2007, p.
287).
We thus arrive at a criterion for conceptu-
ality,  which  can  be  called,  following  Allen
(1999), the “transcendence of particular stimuli”
or, in terms given by Pylyshyn (1990), the “cri-
terion  of  informational  plasticity”.  Essentially
the  criterion  requires  the  “possibility  of  the
modification of a response in the light of addi-
tional information” (Allen 1999); the kind of re-
sponse  has  to  depend,  crucially,  on  other
sources  of  information  (cf.  Newen &  Bartels
2007, p. 287).
The criterion considered above is still not
sharp enough. As long as we do not further spe-
cify the “modification of a response” occurring
“in  the  light  of  additional  information”,  each
sort of extension of the processing capacities of
an individual would count as reaching the level
of “conceptuality” if only this extension enables
the  individual  to  integrate  some  additional
9 One example of a “rigid mechanism” is the behavior of ants re-
sponding to the presence of acidic byproducts from the decom-
position of dead con-specifics: in tests they rigidly remove any-
thing  from the  nest  that  is  painted with  oleic  acid,  even  live
con-specifics.
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source of information into its behavioral reper-
toire. Thus diversification of processing capacit-
ies could then not be distinguished from trans-
ition  from  non-conceptual  to  conceptual  pro-
cessing capacities. 
To get a criterion for conceptuality it is re-
quired  that  the  “modification  of  a  response”
mentioned  above  concerns  classificatory beha-
vior.  The “additional  stimulus”,  in  that  case,
not only has to work as a switching point, open-
ing  one  or  the  other  pathway for  a  response
within a non-conceptual behavioral pattern, it
also has to stand for a  category,  according to
which the actual behavioral pattern can be clas-
sified. 
One example of additional stimuli charac-
teristics  standing for  a  category has been de-
scribed by Newen & Bartels (2007) with respect
to  the  conceptual  abilities  of  the  grey  parrot
Alex (Pepperberg 1999). In order to be able to
form elementary color concepts, for example the
concept “green”, Alex should not only be able
to generalize over a class of similar stimuli and
thus to identify a sample of different green ob-
jects, but should additionally be able to repres-
ent green as a color. Only then could we ascribe
to him the ability to classify green objects ac-
cording to a well-determined class concept.
The test  items by which Pepperberg ex-
amined the classification abilities of the animal
were,  for  instance,  “What  color?”  or  “What
shape?”. These questions should 
[…]  determine if  he [Alex]  could respond
not only to specific properties or patterns
of stimuli [e.g., to green objects], but also
to classes or categories to which these spe-
cific  properties  or  patterns  belong  […].
Could he, for example, go beyond recog-
nizing what is, or is not, ‘green’ to recog-
nizing  the  nature  of  the  relationship
between a green pen and a blade of grass?
(cf. Pepperberg 1999, p. 52)
It happened that Alex was indeed able to clas-
sify  the  given  “key”  stimulus,  e.g.,  a  green,
round  object,  visually  presented  to  him,  as
“green”  or  “round”  according  to  different  di-
mensions (e.g.,  color or shape) represented by
additional  auditory  stimuli.  His  choice  of  re-
sponse (“green” or “round”) turned out to de-
pend crucially on the “additional information”
given in form of the auditory stimulus. As such,
Newen and Bartels  concluded that  “Alex was
able to represent different properties while hav-
ing only one and the same visual input of an
object.”10 
With this example in view, Newen & Bar-
tels (2007)  formulated  the  following  require-
ments  for  the  possession  of  concepts—for  in-
stance,  the concept “red”: A cognitive system
has the concept “red” only if (i) it has relative
stimulus independence such that it depends on
some additional mechanism—which detects and
weighs stimuli  other than the key stimulus of
redness—to determine that the system focuses
on redness while perceiving a red square, in con-
trast to some other property; and (ii) the prop-
erty of being red is represented as an instance of
the dimension “color”.11
Note that the above-mentioned definition
of conceptuality does not only require the exist-
ence of some “additional stimulus” to which the
individual has to be responsive, but that there
has to be some additional internal mechanism of
processing  by which  the  individual  is  able  to
“detect and weigh” a specific additional stimu-
lus  as  standing  for  a  category  (e.g.,  “color”).
The  responsiveness  of  the  individual  to  that
stimulus shows up when it focuses its attention
on those aspects of a scene, or to those items of
a  behavioral  pattern,  which exemplify  the re-
spective category.
Another example would be the balancing
of coffee cups by a waiter in a restaurant. Let
us assume that the waiter for some time pos-
sesses  the ability to  balance  cups  of  different
shapes without spilling coffee, and without con-
sciously attending to a particular  cup,  or the
10 Cf.  Newen &  Bartels (2007),  p.  293.  That  the  auditory  stimuli
“What color?” or “What shape?” were really understood by Alex as
asking for the respective category was tested by Pepperberg using
additional auditory signals of the form “What’s same?” and “What’s
different?” The correct response would be the label of the appropri-
ate category, e.g., the mastery of categories could be verified in the
sense that Alex successfully identified the essential functional role of
category terms like “color” or “shape” as dividing the objects of the
world into “sameness” equivalence classes. 
11 Cf. Newen & Bartels (2007), p. 296. These conditions are only two of
a total of four conditions. But only these two matter with respect to
our discussion.
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shape of a particular cup that he is currently
dealing  with.  At  some  point  he  is  told  that
there are essentially two different kinds of cups,
one high and cylindrical, and the other flat and
bowl-shaped (this information is the “additional
stimulus”). The waiter “detects and weighs” the
additional  stimulus  by  focusing  his  attention,
from that time on, to his own specific handling
of cups, depending on the sort of cup a particu-
lar exemplar belongs to. He might then detect
that he had previously managed to deal with
both kinds of cups efficiently and without spill-
ing coffee without even noticing that liquids in
both  reacted  in  different  ways  to  his  move-
ments. The waiter’s behavior has switched from
a former “non-conceptual”  dealing with coffee
cups to a form of behavior that is “conceptual”
in the sense of exhibiting an additional ability,
namely the ability to classify his own perform-
ance in balancing coffee cups according to a cat-
egory (in this case the cups’ shape).
How does such a notion of conceptuality
relate to Evans’ notion of non-conceptual know-
ledge in terms of first-person dispositions that
we made use of in sections 2 and 4? If the pos-
session of concepts is constituted (in contrast to
non-conceptual  cognitive  processing)  by  the
gaining of additional abilities, it should be made
plausible how those additional abilities connect
to a non-conceptual basis in Evans’ theory.
In our treatment of his theory, we followed
an  interpretation  of  Evans’  work  as  implying
that non-conceptual knowledge relies on the dis-
position to have one’s own motor reactions be
determined by sensory and kinesthetic informa-
tion that is mediated by either some external
object or by one’s own body. Again, the waiter
dealing with the coffee cups may help to illus-
trate the point. The waiter’s experienced hand-
ling relies on a disposition to have his motor ac-
tions determined by the multimodal sensory in-
formation  that  is  mediated  by  holding  coffee
cups in his hands. The waiter’s knowledge-how
to balance the cup might be completely inde-
pendent  of  any conceptual  reference  to  coffee
cups. He could be the experienced waiter that
he  is—at  least  with  respect  to  his  balancing
ability—without even knowing in a conceptual
way “what a coffee cup is”. Reference to the ob-
jects he is dealing with was accomplished only
by being able to react in a coordinated way to
sensorimotor information originating from hand-
ling these objects. 
At  the  time  he  is  told  that  coffee  cups
come in two different shapes, his cognitive sys-
tem enables him to use that information such
that  he  begins  to  rely  on  a  category  (i.e.,  a
cup’s shape) in order to refer to coffee cups, and
to classify his own balancing behavior according
to the objects thus categorized. He reaches, in
some  minimal  way,  the  level  of  conceptual
knowledge, since he now begins to identify both,
that is,  the objects and his behavior with re-
spect to these objects, by conceptual means.
7 Explaining the peculiarities of 
knowledge-how by means of 
conceptuality 
Equipped with an adequate notion of conceptu-
ality, we now proceed to show that concept-pos-
session is exactly what is needed for a cognitive
system to overcome the specific limitations as-
sociated with knowledge-how, and hence be able
to gain access  to  the level  of  knowledge-that.
Why exactly is it necessary for a system to pos-
sess  concept-like  representations  in  order  to
have knowledge-that as opposed to knowledge-
how?
1. Context-bound versus context-free knowledge.
For this polar contrast the answer, in short,
will  be  that  conceptual  representations  are
precisely  those  representations  which  make
the  subject  able  to  generalize  information
over  a  range  of  different  behavioral  situ-
ations. Conceptual representations are, as we
have seen above, representations whose func-
tional role is to classify aspects of a scene, or
items of a behavioral pattern, according to a
certain category. This is the reason why only
conceptual  knowledge (whether verbally ex-
pressible or not) can enable overcoming the
limits of situationally-bound use. Intuitively
sampling objects, for example, on the basis of
some salient similarity criterion,  is  a  mani-
festation  of  knowledge-how,  because  it  de-
pends  on  situational  features—for  instance
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that the situation represents some sort of av-
erage type to which the corresponding beha-
vior is adapted. To overcome such situational
limitations,  categorical  distinctions  have  to
be  introduced  that  enable  the  subject  to
transfer his or her knowledge partly to new
situations that deviate, for instance, with re-
spect to the objects that have been treated in
standard  situations.  For  example,  a  waiter
who starts to work in a new restaurant using
only coffee cups of one type, that is slightly
higher than the large type used in the former
restaurant, might fail in balancing the cup as
long as he only takes recourse to his know-
ledge-how; but he might be more successful if
he relied on a conceptual understanding of a
distinguished  large-cup-technique.  In  the
same  way,  anticipation  of  the  flight  of  a
javelin  is  a  situation-bound ability,  since  it
depends  on  relatively  rigid  processing  of
visual information and proprioceptive mech-
anisms that are well-adapted to a range of
standard cases, but fail for cases outside that
range. If the case is exceptional (e.g., strong
wind from behind), the subject can only at-
tain success by analyzing the influence that
this particular external condition will have on
the standard performance. The same applies
for  knowledge-how  expert  chess  knowledge,
which fails in cases of random constellations
because the experts’  expertise in evaluating
the scene is dependent on average situational
features. The occurrence of “new” constella-
tions  requires  extracting  general  properties
from the scene, and thus has to be done by
means of conceptual representations.
2. Impenetrability versus penetrability of know-
ledge is a contrast almost built into the no-
tion of conceptuality that we propose. Non-
conceptual representations are non-receptive
for additional stimuli that could yield classi-
ficatory behavior.  They have  to be  non-re-
ceptive (“impenetrable”) in order to avoid in-
terferences  that  could  disrupt  the  more  or
less  rigid  mechanisms  by which  some well-
defined  type  of  behavior  is  regularly  pro-
duced. Impenetrable knowledge-how, for ex-
ample, is manifested by navigating ants cal-
culating their way home according to some
rigid  computational  processes  that  are  de-
ployed  on  the  basis  of  a  small  number  of
parameters.  If  the  experimenter  interferes
with the process by repositioning the ant, the
mechanism still works as it would have done
without relocation, with the result that the
ant misses the nest by exactly the distance
and  direction  to  which  it  has  been  reposi-
tioned  by  the  experimenter  (see  Bartels &
May 2009).  In  contrast,  conceptually-based
processing has to be penetrable in order to
guarantee that categorical information can be
extracted from the scene according to specific
stimuli (in this case the repositioning stimuli)
and used in evaluating the result  produced
by rigid processing up to the time of reposi-
tioning.
3. Implicit versus explicit knowledge.  This dis-
tinction refers to whether or not the knowing
organism has knowledge of the rules govern-
ing its knowledge application.  For example,
people  learn  the  grammar  of  their  natural
language or internalize their society’s norms
implicitly, that is without knowledge of the
principles  that  guide  their  language  use  or
their  social  behavior.  In  such  cases  people
represent rules only  indirectly,  by means of
dispositions to have their  reactions determ-
ined by the linguistic or social information in
a way that can be recognized by their fellow
subjects  as  to  be  in  accordance  with  the
rules. In contrast, explicit knowledge requires
direct  representation  of  rules,  objects,  or
properties. The waiter in the restaurant, for
example,  after  having  achieved  knowledge-
that  about  his  balancing  of  coffee  cups,  is
able  to  refer  directly  to  two  sorts  of  cup
shape,  the  high  and  cylindrical  or  the  flat
and  bowl-shaped,  respectively.  In  other
words, he must be able to represent proper-
ties; if so, the waiter would, for instance, be
able to draw inferences from the contents of
his knowledge. Now, a person’s ability to pro-
duce attribute-representations of objects pre-
supposes the ability to apply categories to his
or  her  own  experience.  For  example,  the
waiter is able to represent coffee cups as high
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and cylindrical objects because his capacities
include the ability to apply the category of
shape to the objects he is balancing. Thus, a
person’s possession of conceptual capacities is
a condition that has to be fulfilled for his or
her knowledge to be explicit. Moreover, given
that the additional conditions for  conscious
processing  of  cognitive  representations  are
fulfilled, the subject would then be able to
consciously  think  about  and  to  draw  con-
scious inferences about the objects. In addi-
tion,  verbalizability of knowledge depends on
the presence of this conscious form of explicit
knowledge.
4. Automatic versus effortful processing. As we
have  argued  in  (B),  conceptuality  entails
openness  to  penetration.  Now,  if  cognitive
processing is receptive to penetration, addi-
tional costs in terms of attention and addi-
tional  processing  necessarily  occur.  If  the
ant’s  navigation  mechanisms  were  receptive
to a certain type of repositioning, it  would
have to use additional  computational  path-
ways  for  processing  “repositioning  informa-
tion” and would be in need of additional cal-
culation  to  determine  the  influence  of  the
particular  repositioning  on  the  result  pro-
duced  by  rigid  calculation  of  the  expected
path back home.
5. Continuous versus  discontinuous processing.
Knowledge-that is characteristically used in a
step-by-step manner with intermediate know-
ledge  states  (discontinuous),  whereas  know-
ledge-how appears to be grounded in smooth
and  fluent  processing  without  intermediate
states (continuous). The difference can be ac-
counted for by the fact that knowledge-that
is  grounded in concept-based processing al-
lowing for and instantiating discrete inferen-
tial  steps,  whereas  knowledge-how is  based
on  concept-free  processing  without  clearly-
defined  intermediate  knowledge  states.  An
observable  consequence  of  the  continuous
nature  of  knowledge-how  is  that  lapses  in
knowledge use result in graded errors, or con-
tinuous distributions of errors (e.g., gradual
precision losses of sensorimotor movements),
while lapses in use of knowledge-that express
themselves  in  categorical  errors,  or  discon-
tinuous error distributions (e.g., switches of
categories or total failures to come up with a
result).
It is beyond the scope of the present article
to give an outline of a research agenda for
empirically confirming and underpinning the
present account of knowledge-how compared
to knowledge-that. Different examples of po-
tential  research  areas  and  experimental
paradigms have been pointed out in the pre-
ceding sections (e.g.,  numerosity judgments,
spatial  memory,  intuitive  knowledge  use).
The most convincing way to support the ad-
equacy of the conceptuality criterion for dis-
tinguishing  between  knowledge-how  and
knowledge-that  will  be  to  run  new  experi-
ments in these or other research areas that
reveal behavioral and/or neural dissociations
that  comply  with  the  distinction  between
concept-driven vs. concept-free knowledge-use
along the lines of the different peculiarities of
practical knowledge outlined above. 
8 Conclusion
We have shown that propositionality is, in none
of its three main senses, an adequate and useful
demarcation  criterion  between  knowledge-how
and knowledge-that. 
First, in its  semantic  sense (e.g.,  Stanley
2011a), propositionality applies to both know-
ledge-how and knowledge-that, and thus  a for-
tiori cannot be successfully used as a demarca-
tion criterion. 
Second,  in  its  “language  of  mind”-sense,
propositionality applies to knowledge represent-
ation. As we have shown, the way in which a
particular piece of knowledge is represented is
independent from the type of knowledge exem-
plified by this piece of knowledge. Thus, again,
this sense of propositionality is not useful as a
demarcation criterion. 
Third, propositionality in the sense of lin-
guistic,  consciously  available  propositions is
without doubt a central phenomenological trait
of  knowledge-that  as  opposed  to  knowledge-
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how. On the one hand, this sort of proposition-
ality  offers  a  rather  trivial  demarcation  cri-
terion. On the other hand, as a mere replication
of a well-known phenomenological distinction, it
can in no way be used to  explain  the different
peculiarities  characteristic  of  knowledge-how
versus knowledge-that. Anti-intellectualists have
tried to fill the void corresponding to non-pro-
positionality,  according  to  this  third  sense  of
propositionality, by declaring specific knowledge
formats  such  as  sensorimotor  or  image-like
knowledge (Newen & Jung 2011). In our view,
it  is  doubtful  whether,  with  such  an  eclectic
way of  characterizing  knowledge-how,  a  satis-
factory  and  complete  classification  of  know-
ledge-how could be achieved. We have, for ex-
ample, argued that “intuitive” knowledge would
be a further  legitimate candidate for  the list,
and that it is, in all probability, not the only
further candidate. Identifying different forms of
knowledge-how without any well-grounded the-
oretical basis for the different forms will prob-
ably be of limited use for empirical research in
cognitive science, neuroscience, and psychology. 
In sum, “propositionality” can in none of
its different senses provide a useful demarcation
criterion  for  an  empirically-fruitful  theory  of
knowledge-how. Therefore,  we go with the  in-
tellectualists, at least with respect to rejecting
the  propositionality  criterion,  but  we  depart
where intellectualists fail to provide positive ac-
counts of the obvious phenomenological and em-
pirical peculiarities making knowledge-how dis-
tinct from knowledge-that. In contrast to the in-
tellectualist position, we have provided a min-
imal  notion  of  conceptuality  as  an  alternative
demarcation criterion. We suggest that concep-
tuality gives a sound basis for a fruitful theory
of knowledge-how, and we have tried to provide
support to this suggestion by showing that by
means of an adequate notion of conceptuality,
five  central  peculiarities  of  knowledge-how  as
compared to knowledge-that can be accounted
for. Future research will have to show whether
the framework for practical knowledge described
here fulfills  the empirical  promise we think it
has.
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